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Abstract
We analyze the setting of minimum-cost perfect matchings with selfish vertices through the
price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS) lens. The underlying solution concept used for
this analysis is the Gale-Shapley stable matching notion, where the preferences are determined
so that each player (vertex) wishes to minimize the cost of her own matching edge.
Keywords: minimum-cost perfect matching, stable matching, price of anarchy, price of stability,
metric costs, α-stability.
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1 Introduction
Studying the impact of selfish players has been a major theoretical computer science success story
in the last decade (see, e.g., the 2012 Go¨del Prize [25, 37, 30]). In particular, much effort has been
invested in quantifying how the efficiency of a system degrades due to the selfishness of its players.
The most notable notions in this context are the price of anarchy (PoA) [25, 31] and the price of
stability (PoS) [38, 4], comparing the best possible outcome to the outcome of the worst (PoA) or
best (PoS) solution with selfish players. Selfishness in this regard is usually captured by the Nash
equilibrium solution concept, where no player can benefit from a unilateral deviation.
The players considered in the current paper are identified with the vertices of a complete (or
complete bipartite) weighted graph; our goal is then to analyze the PoA and PoS of minimum-
cost perfect matchings, where the efficiency of an outcome (a matching incident to all vertices) is
measured in terms of the sum of edge weights (a.k.a. costs). Since unilateral deviations do not
make sense in a matching setting, we replace the Nash equilibrium solution concept with that of
the Gale-Shapley stable matching notion [17], where no two unmatched players (strictly) prefer
each other over their current matching partners, defining the preferences so that each player wishes
to minimize the weight of the matching edge on which she is incident.
It is not difficult to show that a stable perfect matching always exists in a complete (or complete
bipartite) weighted graph with an even number of vertices (cf. [6] or the proof of Lemma 4.2 in the
current paper). Yet, a simple example shows that in general, the situation is hopeless (unbounded
PoA and PoS): Let G be a complete graph on four nodes u1, u2, v1, v2 with edge weights w(u1, v1) =
w(u2, v2) = 1, w(u1, u2) = ε for some small ε > 0, and w(v1, v2) = w(u1, v2) = w(u2, v1) = W for
some large W . Then, the optimal perfect matching matches ui to vi for i = 1, 2 with a cost of 2,
whereas the unique stable matching (and any reasonable approximation thereof) must match u1 to
u2, and hence also v1 to v2 which incurs a large cost.
The problem becomes much more interesting if we restrict ourselves to metric instances, namely,
graphs with edge weights that obey the triangle inequality (or its bipartite counterpart). Such
instances correspond to settings where the players’ preferences are biased towards players of a
similar type, e.g., when the players prefer to be matched to players of a geographical proximity,
with a similar taste in film and music, or with a similar appreciation for coriander. Indeed, we
establish an upper bound of O(nlog(3/2)) on the PoA and PoS of minimum-cost perfect matchings in
metric graphs with 2n vertices, where log(3/2) ' 0.58, and show that this is asymptotically tight.1
The somewhat unattractive polynomial dependency on n raises the following question: How does
PoS improve once the Gale-Shapley stability is relaxed to α-stability, where two unmatched vertices
deviate from the current matching only if both improve their costs by a factor greater than α ≥ 1?
(Observe that since, by definition, every stable matching is also α-stable, this question is irrelevant
in the context of PoA that can only increase by such a relaxation.) We answer this question by
1 In this paper, log x denotes the logarithm of x to the base of 2.
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establishing an asymptotically tight trade-off, showing that with respect to α-stable matchings,
PoS improves to Θ(nlog(1+
1
2α)); in particular, taking α = O(log n) yields a constant PoS. All our
results hold for both simple and bipartite metric graphs.
Related work. Finding a maximum matching in a graph is among the most extensively studied
problems in combinatorial optimization. Edmonds presented the first poly-time algorithm for the
unweighted version of the problem as well as a solution for finding a maximum-weight matching in
weighted graphs [14, 13] and initiated a long and fruitful line of work on this problem [19, 26, 32,
2, 16, 27, 28]. Reducing the minimum-weight perfect matching problem in complete graphs to the
maximum-weight matching problem is trivial.
In the stable matching setting, originally introduced by Gale and Shapley [17], each node is
equipped with a totally ordered list of preferences on the other nodes. Gale and Shapley showed that
in the bipartite (marriage) variant, a stable matching always exists, and in fact, can be computed
by a simple poly-time algorithm. In contrast, the all-pairs (roommates) variant does not necessarily
have a solution. Both variants of the stable matching problem admit a plethora of literature; see,
e.g., the books of Knuth [23], Gusfield and Irving [18], and Roth and Sotomayoror [34].
Sometimes, the nodes’ preferences are associated with real costs so that each preference list is
sorted in order of increasing (or non-decreasing if ties are allowed) costs. This setting gives rise
to the problem of computing a minimum-cost stable matching (a generalization of the egalitarian
stable matching problem). Irving et al. [20] and Feder [15] designed poly-time algorithms for
the bipartite variant of this problem; the NP-hardness of the all-pairs variant was established by
Feder [15] who also showed that the problem admits a 2-approximation.
The results discussed so far apply to arbitrary preference lists, where the nodes’ preferences
exhibit no intrinsic correlations. Several approaches have been taken towards introducing some
consistency in the preference lists [23, 29, 21]. Most relevant to the current paper is the approach
of Arkin et al. [6] who studied the geometric stable roommate problem, where the nodes correspond
to points in a Euclidean space and the preferences are given by the sorted distances to the other
points. They showed that in the geometric setting, a stable matching always exists and that it is
unique if the nodes’ preferences exhibit no ties. These results easily generalize to arbitrary metric
spaces. Arkin et al. also introduced the notion of an α-stable matching for α ≥ 1 — which is central
to the current paper — where nodes are only willing to switch to a new match if they can improve
over their current partner by more than an α-factor.
From a game theoretic perspective, it is interesting to point out that the algorithm of Gale and
Shapley is not incentive compatible, namely, a strategic player will not necessarily cooperate with
this algorithm when probed for her preferences. In fact, Roth [33] showed that there does not exist
a stable marriage algorithm under which, it is a dominant strategy for all players to be truthful
about their preferences. We do not consider the issue of incentive compatibility in the current
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paper (it is not even clear how this is defined in a weighted undirected graph).
The price of anarchy was introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [25, 31] and since then
has become a cornerstone of algorithmic game theory. The price of stability was first studied by
Schulz and Stier Moses [38], while the term itself was coined by Anshelevich et al. [4]. Since their
introduction, the price of anarchy and the price of stability have been extensively analyzed in diverse
settings such as selfish routing [37, 35, 4, 39, 7, 11, 10], network formation games [40, 5, 1, 9, 3],
job scheduling [25, 12, 24, 8], and resource allocation [22, 36].
2 Setting and Preliminaries
Consider a graph G with vertex set V (G) and edge set E(G). Each edge e ∈ E(G) is assigned
with a positive real weight w(e). Unless stated otherwise, the graphs mentioned in this paper
have 2n vertices, n ∈ Z>0, and they are either complete (|E(G)| =
(
2n
2
)
) or complete bipartite
(V (G) = U1 ∪ U2, |U1| = |U2| = n and |E(G)| = n2). We say that the complete (or complete
bipartite) graph G is metric if w(x, y) = distG(x, y) for every edge (x, y) ∈ E(G), where distG(x, y)
denotes the distance between x and y in G with respect to the edge weights w(·, ·).
A matching is a subset M ⊆ E(G) of the edges such that every vertex in V (G) is incident to at
most one edge in M . The matching is called perfect if every vertex in V (G) is incident to exactly
one edge in M , which implies that |M | = n as |V (G)| = 2n. For a perfect matching M and a
vertex x ∈ V (G), we denote by M(x) the unique vertex y ∈ V (G) such that (x, y) ∈ M . Unless
stated otherwise, all matchings mentioned hereafter are assumed to be perfect. (Perfect matchings
clearly exist in a complete or complete bipartite graph with an even number of vertices.) Given an
edge subset F ⊆ E(G), we define the cost of F as the total weight of all edges in F , denoted by
c(F ) =
∑
e∈F w(e); in particular, the cost of a matching is the sum of its edge weights.
Definition (α-Stable Matching). Consider some (perfect) matching M ⊆ E(G) and some real
number α ≥ 1. An edge (u, v) /∈ M is called α-unstable with respect to M if α · w(u, v) <
min{w(u,M(u)), w(v,M(v))}. Otherwise, the edge is called α-stable. A matching M is called
α-stable if it does not admit any α-unstable edge. We will omit the parameter α and call edges as
well as matchings just stable or unstable whenever α is clear from the context or the argumentation
holds for every choice of α.
Let M∗ denote a certain (perfect) matching M that minimizes c(M). For simplicity, in what
follows, we restrict our attention to complete (rather than complete bipartite) graphs, although all
our results hold also for the complete bipartite case.
Definition (Price of Anarchy). The price of anarchy of a graph G, denoted by PoA(G), is de-
fined as PoA(G) = max{c(M)/c(M∗) : M is a stable matching}. Let PoA(2n) = sup{PoA(G) :
G is metric, |V (G)| = 2n}.
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Definition (α-Price of Stability). The α-price of stability of G, denoted by PoSα(G), is defined
as PoSα(G) = min{c(M)/c(M∗) : M is an α-stable matching}. Let PoSα(2n) = sup{PoSα(G) :
G is metric, |V (G)| = 2n}. Unless stated otherwise, when the parameter α is omitted, we refer to
the case α = 1.
3 Price of Anarchy
Our goal in this section is to establish the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. The PoA of minimum-cost perfect matchings in metric graphs with 2n vertices is
Θ(nlog(3/2)).
Theorem 3.1 is established via a series of reductions, essentially showing that PoA(2n) is realized
by weighted line graphs, namely, metric graphs that can be embedded isometrically into the real
line. Following that, we introduce a family of weighted line graphs with PoA of Θ(nlog(3/2)) and
show that no other weighted line graph admits higher PoA. It is interesting to point out that this
family of weighted line graphs was first introduced by Reingold and Tarjan [32] for the analysis of
a greedy algorithm approximating the minimum-cost perfect matching problem in metric graphs
(with no stability considerations).
Definition (Matching Configuration). A matching configuration (MC) ξ = (G,M∗,M) consists of
a metric graph G, a minimum-cost matching M∗, and a stable matching M on G. The ratio of ξ
is defined as ρ(ξ) := c(M)/c(M∗).
Observe that the definition of a MC ξ implies a collection A(ξ) of alternating cycles in the
symmetric difference M ⊕M∗; the cycles in A(ξ) are referred to hereafter as the alternating cycles
exhibited by ξ. We say that ξ is spanned by the cycles in A(ξ) if each vertex of G belongs to an
alternating cycle in A(ξ). Clearly, graphs with 2 vertices admit a single (perfect) matching, hence
PoA(2) = 1, so in what follows, it suffices to consider MCs on 2n vertices for n > 1. The following
lemma states that it also suffices to consider MCs spanned by a single alternating cycle.
Lemma 3.2. For every MC ξ = (G,M∗,M) on 2n vertices, there exists a MC ξˆ on 2n′ vertices,
1 < n′ ≤ n, spanned by a single alternating cycle such that ρ(ξˆ) ≥ ρ(ξ).
Proof. Since A(ξ) = ∅ implies ρ(ξ) = 1, we may assume hereafter that |A(ξ)| ≥ 1, so let A be
an alternating cycle in A(ξ) that maximizes the ratio c(MA)/c(M∗A), where MA and M∗A are the
matchings M∗ and M , respectively, restricted to the edges of A. Let GA be the subgraph of G
induced by V (A) and take ξˆ = (GA,M
∗
A,MA). Observe that ξˆ is a valid MC, since M
∗
A and MA
are still a minimum-cost matching and a stable matching, respectively, in GA. By the choice of A,
it follows that ρ(ξˆ) ≥ ρ(ξ).
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Definition (Weighted Cycle MC). A MC ξ = (G,M∗,M) is said to be a weighted cycle MC if ξ
is spanned by a single alternating cycle A and the edge weights in G agree with the distances in
the subgraph of G induced by the edges in E(A).
Our next lemma states that it suffices to bound the PoA in weighted cycle MCs.
Lemma 3.3. For every MC ξ = (G,M∗,M) on 2n vertices which is spanned by a single alternating
cycle, there exists a weighted cycle MC ξˆ on 2n vertices such that ρ(ξˆ) ≥ ρ(ξ).
Proof. Let A be the single alternating cycle spanning ξ. If ξ is not a weighted cycle MC, then G
must admit a shortcut — an edge (x, y) ∈ E(G) − E(A) satisfying w(x, y) < distA(x, y), where
distA(x, y) denotes the distance between x and y in the (weighted) cycle A. Let (x, y) be a shortcut
minimizing w(x, y) and let z ∈ V (G) \ {x, y} be the vertex minimizing w(x, z) + w(z, y). Observe
that w(x, y) must be strictly smaller than w(x, z)+w(z, y) as (x, y) is a shortcut of G and G does not
admit any shorter shortcut. We argue that the weight of (x, y) can be increased to w(x, z)+w(z, y)
without violating the validity of ξ as a MC. The assertion follows since by repeating this step
(finitely many times), we remove all the shortcuts of G. To that end, note that after increasing
w(x, y) to w(x, z) + w(z, y), M∗ remains a minimum-cost matching of G (we only increased the
weight of some edge not in M∗) and M remains a stable matching of G (we only increased the
weight of some edge not in M). So, all we have to show is that G remains metric, which follows
from the choice of z.
Definition (Weighted Line MC). We say that a (2n)-vertex metric graph G is a weighted line
graph if it can be isometrically embedded into the real line. As such, it is convenient to identify the
vertices of G with the reals x1 < · · · < x2n so that w(xi, xj) = xj − xi for every 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 2n. In
some cases, it will also be convenient to define a weighted line graph by setting the all differences
xi+1 − xi without explicitly specifying the xis themselves. A weighted line MC ξ = (G,M∗,M) is
a MC on 2n vertices satisfying: (1) G is a weighted line graph; (2) M∗ = {(x2i−1, x2i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n};
and (3) M = {(x2i, x2i+1) | 1 ≤ i < n} ∪ {(x1, x2n)}. Observe that ξ is spanned by a single
alternating cycle A = (x1, . . . , x2n, x1).
Note that requirement (2) in the definition is not really necessary: the requirement that G is
a weighted line graph already implies that {(x2i−1, x2i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} is the unique minimum-cost
matching of G as every other matching M ′ contains some edge (xi, xj) such that xj − xi > 1; it is
easy to show that such an edge must belong to an improving alternating cycle, hence M ′ cannot
be optimal. Given a (2n)-vertex weighted line graph G, we shall subsequently denote this unique
minimum-cost stable matching by M∗(G) and the matching {(x2i, x2i+1) | 1 ≤ i < n} ∪ {(x1, x2n)}
by M(G). By definition, ξ = (G,M∗(G),M(G)) is a valid (weighted line) MC if and only if M(G)
is stable. Note also that a weighted line MC is a refinement of a weighted cycle MC, with the
additional requirement that the weight of the longest edge in the unique alternating cycle A equals
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the total weight of all other edges of A. Building on this fact, the next lemma states that it suffices
to consider weighted line MCs.
Lemma 3.4. For every weighted cycle MC ξ = (G,M∗,M) on 2n vertices, there exists a weighted
line MC ξˆ on 2n vertices such that ρ(ξˆ) ≥ ρ(ξ).
Proof. Let A be the single alternating cycle spanning ξ and let e be an edge in M that maximizes
w(e). Let W−e =
∑
e′∈E(A)\{e}w(e
′). Clearly, w(e) ≤W−e, as otherwise, G is not metric. We argue
that if w(e) < W−e, then the weight of e can be increased to W−e without violating the validity of ξ
as a MC; the assertion follows because this step turns ξ into a weighted line MC. To that end, note
that after increasing w(e) to W−e, G remains metric (ξ is a weighted cycle MC) and M∗ remains
a minimum-cost matching (we only increased the weight of some edge not in M∗). So, all we have
to show is that M remains stable, which follows from the choice of e.
Once we restrict our attention to weighted line configurations, we can augment G with new
vertices without significantly affecting the ratio of the MC.
Lemma 3.5. For every weighted line MC ξ = (G,M∗,M) on 2n vertices and for any  > 0, there
exists a weighted line MC ξˆ on 2(n+ 1) vertices such that ρ(ξˆ) ≥ ρ(ξ)− .
Proof. Recall that the vertices of G are identified with the reals x1 < . . . < x2n. Let Gˆ be the
weighted line graph obtained from G by augmenting V (G) with two new vertices identified with
the reals y = x2n + δ and y
′ = y + δ′ for some sufficiently small δ′ > δ > 0. The assertion follows
since by taking a sufficiently small δ, we guarantee that M(Gˆ) is stable in Gˆ, whereas by taking a
sufficiently small δ′, we guarantee that c(M(Gˆ))/c(M∗(Gˆ)) ≥ ρ(ξ)− .
We now turn to present a family of metric graphs referred to as Reingold-Tarjan graphs, ac-
knowledging Reingold and Tarjan’s paper [32], where these graphs were first introduced. Consider
some integer k > 0. The kth Reingold-Tarjan graph Hk is a weighted line graph whose 2k vertices
are identified with the reals xk1 < · · · < xk2k . It is defined recursively: For k = 1, we set x12−x11 = 1.
Assume that Hk is already defined and let Dk = xk
2k
− xk1 be its diameter. Then, Hk+1 is de-
fined by placing 2 disjoint instances of Hk on the real line with an Sk+1 spacing between them,
i.e., xk+1
2k+1
− xk+1
2k
= Sk+1, yielding Dk+1 = 2 · Dk + Sk+1. In the current2 construction, we set
Sk = Dk−1, thus the diameter of Hk satisfies Dk = 3k−1. Refer to Fig. 1 for an illustration.
Recall that M∗(Hk) matches xk2i−1 with x
k
2i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k−1; since all these edges
have weight 1, it follows that c(M∗(Hk)) = 2k−1. Furthermore, we argue by induction on k
that the matching M(Hk) = {(xk2i, xk2i+1) | 1 ≤ i < 2k} ∪ {(xk1, xk2k)} is stable; whose cost is
2 A generalization of the Reingold-Tarjan graphs is presented in Sect. 4.4, where we use a different value for Sk.
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1/α− ε
1
H2
H3
︸ ︷︷ ︸︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1/α− ε)(2 + 1/α− ε)2
H4
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1/α− ε)(2 + 1/α− ε)
H1
︸︷︷︸
1
M
Figure 1: This extended version of the Reingold-Tarjan graph H4 with 24 vertices has a unique “expensive”
α-stable matching M . Setting the optional parameters α and ε (that are used in the proof of the PoS lower
bound) to 1 and 0, respectively, yields the original Reingold-Tarjan graph H4.
c(M(Hk)) = Dk + (Dk − c(M∗)) = 2 · 3k−1 − 2k−1. Therefore, ξkRT = (Hk,M∗(HK),M(H∗)),
referred to hereafter as the kth Reingold-Tarjan MC, is a valid weighted line MC with ratio
ρ(ξkRT ) =
c(M(Hk))
c(M∗(Hk))
=
2 · 3k−1 − 2k−1
2k−1
= Θ
(
(3/2)k−1
)
= Θ
(
nlog(3/2)
)
,
where the last equation follows by setting 2n = 2k. Combined with Lemma 3.5, we immediately
conclude that PoA(2n) = Ω(nlog(3/2)), establishing the lower bound part of Theorem 3.1. The
upper bound part of the theorem is established by combining Lemmas 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 with
the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6. The kth Reingold-Tarjan MC ξkRT satisfies ρ(ξ
k
RT ) ≥ ρ(ξ) for any weighted line MC
ξ on 2k vertices.
Proof. By induction on k. The assertion holds trivially for k = 1, so assume that it holds for k and
consider an arbitrary weighted line MC ξ = (G,M∗(G),M(G)) on 2k+1 vertices identified with the
reals x1 < · · · < x2k+1 . Let L and R be the subgraphs of G induced by the vertices x1, . . . , x2k and
x2k+1, . . . , x2k+1 , respectively. Let e = (x2k , x2k+1) and let DL = x2k −x1 and DR = x2k+1 −x2k+1.
We refer to the vertices x1 and x2k (respectively, x2k+1 and x2k+1) as the external vertices of L
(resp., R) and to the vertices x2, . . . , x2k−1 (resp., x2k+2, . . . , x2k+1−1) as the internal vertices of
L (resp., R). Observe that e ∈ M(G) and since M(G) is a stable matching of G, we must have
x2k+1−x2k = w(e) ≤ min{DL, DR} as otherwise, at least one of the edges (x1, x2k) or (x2k+1, x2k+1)
is unstable. Figure 2 illustrates the various notions.
We say that a 2k-vertex weighted line graph is consistent with Hk if it can be obtained from
Hk by scaling the edge weights. Fixing the external vertices of L and R, we argue that the internal
vertices of L and R can be repositioned so that L and R, respectively, become consistent with Hk
without violating the validity of ξ as a weighted line MC and without decreasing the ratio ρ(ξ).
7
x1 x2k+1x2k x2k+1
e
M M∗
︷ ︸︸ ︷L ︷ ︸︸ ︷R
Figure 2: Any MC ξ on 2k vertices can be transformed into a Reingold-Tarjan MC without decreasing the
ratio ρ(ξ). The black edges are part of the minimum-cost matching M∗ while the gray edges belong to the
stable matching M .
We shall establish this fact for L; the proof for R is analogous. Note first that since M(Hk) is
stable in Hk and since w(e) ≤ DL, it follows that by repositioning the internal vertices of L so
that L becomes consistent with HK , we do not violate the stability of M(G). Second, by the
inductive hypothesis, repositioning the internal vertices of L so that L becomes consistent with
HK maximizes c(M(L))/c(M∗(L)), thus ρ(ξ) cannot decrease after this repositioning step, which
establishes the argument. So, assume hereafter that both L and R are consistent with Hk.
Assume without loss of generality that DL ≥ DR, so w(e) = x2k+1 − x2k is at most DR. In
fact, since R is consistent with Hk, it follows that we can increase the difference x2k+1 − x2k until
it is equal to DR, keeping the difference xi+1 − xi unchanged for all other is, without violating the
validity of ξ as a weighted line MC and without decreasing the ratio ρ(ξ). So, assume hereafter
that DL ≥ w(e) = DR. Now, we argue that we can scale down the differences xi+1 − xi for every
1 ≤ i < 2k, keeping xi+1−xi unchanged for all other is, until we obtain DL = w(e) = DR, without
decreasing the ratio ρ(ξ). This completes the proof since DL = w(e) = DR implies that G = H
k+1.
Let ` = c(M(L)) − DL, `∗ = c(M∗(L)), r = c(M(R)) − DR, and r∗ = c(M∗(R)); notice that
`+ `∗ = DL and r + r∗ = DR. Since w(e) = DR, we can express ρ(ξ) as
ρ(ξ) =
c(M(G))
c(M∗(G))
=
2`+ `∗ + 2(r + r∗) + 2r + r∗
`∗ + r∗
=
2`+ `∗ + 4r + 3r∗
`∗ + r∗
.
Recalling that DL ≥ DR, we express DL as DL = (1 + λ)DR for some λ ≥ 0, and so ` = (1 + λ)r
and `∗ = (1 + λ)r∗. Thus,
ρ(ξ) =
2(1 + λ)r + (1 + λ)r∗ + 4r + 3r∗
(1 + λ)r∗ + r∗
=
(6 + 2λ)r + (4 + λ)r∗
(2 + λ)r∗
.
Assuming that the edge weights in G (as a whole) are scaled so that R = HK (rather than merely
being consistent with Hk), and recalling the properties of ξkRT , we get
ρ(ξ) =
(6 + 2λ)(3k−1 − 2k−1) + (4 + λ)2k−1
(2 + λ)2k−1
=
(
6 + 2λ
2 + λ
)
· (3/2)k−1 − 1 .
The lemma follows since the function f(λ) = 6+2λ2+λ is monotonically decreasing for λ ≥ 0.
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4 α-Price of Stability
The upper bound established in Sect. 3 for the PoA clearly holds for the PoS too; the matching
lower bound can be adapted to the PoS by slightly modifying the Reingold-Tarjan graphs so that
they admit a unique stable matching (see Sect. 4.4), implying that PoS(2n) = Θ(nlog(3/2)). So, the
PoS does not provide much of an improvement over the PoA. Consequently, we turn to analyze
the PoS with respect to relaxed stable matchings, establishing the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. The α-PoS of minimum-cost perfect matchings in metric graphs with 2n vertices is
Θ(nlog(1+1/(2α))). In particular, taking α = O(log n) guarantees a constant PoS.
The upper bound promised by Theorem 4.1 is constructive, relying on an efficient greedy algo-
rithm presented in Sect. 4.1. Sect. 4.2 provides a simplified version of the analysis of that greedy
algorithm that holds only for the case of α = O(log n). A more involved analysis that covers
the general case is given in Sect. 4.3. The matching Ω(nlog(1+1/(2α))) lower bound on PoSα(2n) is
established via a generalization of the Reingold-Tarjan graphs in Sect. 4.4.
4.1 Greedy Algorithm for α-Stable Matchings
The following algorithm called Greedy transforms a minimum-cost matching M∗ in a metric graph
into an α-stable matching M .
Start with the minimum-cost matching M ← M∗ and iterate over all edges of G by non-
decreasing order of weights. If the edge (u, v) currently considered is unstable with respect to the
current matching M , set M ←M∪{(u, v), (M(u),M(v))}−{(u,M(u)), (v,M(v))} (this operation
is called a flip of the edge (u, v)) and continue with the next edge. After having iterated over all
edges, return M .
We assume that edge weight ties are resolved in an arbitrary but consistent manner. In the
following, we denote by Mi the matching calculated by the above algorithm at the end of iteration
i. Moreover, M0 = M
∗ is the initial minimum-cost matching and MG the final matching returned
by Greedy. The following lemma shows that the algorithm terminates.
Lemma 4.2. For any unstable edge b created by the flip of an edge e, we have w(b) > w(e).
Proof. We consider the edge e = (u, v) being flipped and we denote by e′ = (M(u),M(v)) the
second new edge joining M as a result of the flip. The two edges that are removed by the flip are
denoted by f and g. See Fig. 3 for an illustration of the situation.
When an edge e is flipped, there are essentially two different cases for an unstable edge to be
created. Either the unstable edge contains one vertex of e or one vertex of e′. No other vertices
are involved in the flip and thus every new unstable edge has to contain at least one of the four
9
ef
e′
g
b2
b1
d
c
Figure 3: This figure illustrates the two different cases of Lemma 4.2.
vertices. We assume without loss of generality that a vertex of the edge g is incident to the unstable
edge created by the flip.
Let us first consider the case where a vertex of e is incident to the new unstable edge. This case is
denoted as the edge b1 in Fig. 3. We assume that b1 is stable before the flip and unstable thereafter.
For b1 to be unstable after the flip, we must have α ·w(b1) < w(e) and α ·w(b1) < w(c). But as e is
unstable before the flip, we have α ·w(e) < w(g) and thus we get α ·w(b1) < w(e) < w(g)/α ≤ w(g).
This means that b1 was already unstable before the flip, which is a contradiction to the assumption.
Hence, no vertex of e can be part of the new unstable edge.
Let us now consider the case, where a vertex from e′ is part of the new unstable edge (b2 in
Fig. 3). Since b2 is stable before the flip and unstable after it, we must have w(g) ≤ α·w(b2) < w(e′).
But as e is unstable before the flip, we have α·w(e) < w(g), and thus we get w(e) < w(g)/α ≤ w(b2)
which completes the proof.
Corollary 4.3 follows by induction on i.
Corollary 4.3. Let ei be the edge considered in iteration i. Then w(ei) < w(b) for any unstable
edge b in Mi.
Lemma 4.4. Greedy transforms a minimum-cost matching into a valid α-stable matching in time
O(n2 log n).
Proof. The running time of the algorithm is dominated by the step of sorting the edges in G
according to their weight. This takes O(n2 log n) steps. The second phase — the actual algorithm
— runs in O(n2) steps since it iterates once over all edges in V × V and each iteration takes O(1)
time.
The correctness of the algorithm is established by Corollary 4.3 since it states that in the last
iteration, all unstable edges have strictly larger weight than the edge currently considered. Since
this edge is already the one with the largest weight, there cannot be any unstable edges in the final
matching MG.
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4.2 Cost Analysis
In this section, we want to bound the cost of the α-stable matching returned by Greedy relative
to the cost of M∗. To this end, we will transcribe the changes that Greedy performs on the
minimum-cost matching through a collection of logical rooted trees, referred to as the flip forest,
and assign weights to the nodes of the trees in this forest that will then allow us to derive an upper
bound on the cost of the α-stable matching returned by the algorithm.
Since this section makes heavy use of rooted binary trees and their properties, we require a few
definitions. In a full binary tree, each inner node has exactly two children. The depth d(v) of a node
v in a tree T is the length of the unique path from the root of T to v and the height h(T ) of a tree
T is defined as the maximal depth of any node in T . The height h(v) of a node v of T is defined
to be the height of its subtree. The leaf set L(T ) or L(F ) of a tree T or a collection F of trees is
the set of all leaves in T or F , respectively. The leaf set L(v) of a node v in a tree is L(Tv) where
Tv is the subtree rooted at v. Finally, two nodes with the same parent are called sibling nodes.
We begin with Lemma 4.5 stating an important property of the edges that are flipped by
Greedy.
Lemma 4.5. If an edge e is flipped in iteration i, then e ∈ Mj for all j ≥ i and in particular
e ∈MG.
Proof. Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that e = (u, v) was flipped in iteration i of
the algorithm and further that (u, v) /∈ Mj for some j > i. According to the algorithm, we have
(u, v) ∈ Mi. Since (u, v) /∈ Mj , there has to exist an iteration k with i < k ≤ j where (u, v) is
removed from Mk−1 such that (u, v) /∈ Mk. For this to happen, either edge (u, u′) or (v, v′) for
some vertex u′ or v′ must be flipped in iteration k because it was unstable with respect to Mk−1.
Without loss of generality, we assume that (u, u′) is unstable with respect to Mk−1 and flipped in
iteration k > i and we have
w(u, u′) ≤ α · w(u, u′) < w(u, v) .
But this means that Greedy would have considered the edge (u, u′) before considering the edge
(u, v), a contradiction to the assumption.
Consider an iteration of Greedy where edge (u, v) is flipped because it was unstable at the
beginning of the iteration. Then the two edges (u,M(u)) and (v,M(v)) are replaced by (u, v) and
(M(u),M(v)). Since, according to Lemma 4.5, the edge (u, v) is selected irrevocably, the edges
(u,M(u)) and (v,M(v)) can never be part of M again. The only edge, of the four edges involved,
that may be changed again, is the edge (M(u),M(v)). Thus, we refer to (M(u),M(v)) as an active
edge. We also refer to all edges in M0 as active. Using the notion of active edges, we shall now
model the changes that Greedy applies to the matching during its execution through a logical
helper structure called the flip forest.
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y ∼ eu z ∼ ev
x ∼ e
u v
M(u) M(v)
⇒eu ev
e
Figure 4: The left side shows a matching configuration with an unstable edge (u, v), which will be flipped
by Greedy. This flip is then represented by the flip tree segment on the right, which depicts the replacement
of the two active edges (u,M(u)) ∼ y and (v,M(v)) ∼ z by the active edge (M(u),M(v)) ∼ x.
Definition (Flip Forest). The flip forest F = (U,K) for a certain execution of Greedy is a
collection of rooted trees with node set U and link set K. It contains a node ue ∈ U corresponding
to each edge e ∈ V ×V that has been active at some stage during the execution. This correspondence
is denoted by ue ∼ e. For each flip of an edge (u, v) in G, resulting in the removal of the edges
(u,M(u)) and (v,M(v)) from M , K contains a link connecting the node y ∼ (u,M(u)) to its parent
x ∼ (M(u),M(v)) and a link connecting the node z ∼ (v,M(v)) to its parent x ∼ (M(u),M(v)).
(Observe that by definition, all three edges (u,M(u)), (v,M(v)), and (M(u),M(v)) are active.)
Refer to Fig. 4 for an illustration.
To avoid confusion between the basic elements of G and the basic elements of F , we refer to
the former as vertices/edges and to the latter as nodes/links.
The definition of a flip forest ensures that for each flip of the algorithm, we obtain a binary
flip tree segment as depicted by Fig. 4. When we transcribe each flip operation of the complete
execution of Greedy into a flip tree segment as explained above, we end up with a collection of
full binary trees — a forest as depicted in Fig. 5. This is because the parent node of a tree segment
may appear as a child node of the tree segment corresponding to a later iteration of the algorithm
since its corresponding edge is still active and therefore may participate in another flip. Each such
tree is called a flip tree hereafter. Observe that all leaves in the flip forest correspond to edges in
the minimum-cost matching M0 = M
∗.
We now define a function ψ : U 7→ R that maps a virtual weight to each node in the flip forest
F as follows. For each leaf ` of a flip tree in F , we set ψ(`) := w(e), where ` ∼ e and we recall that
an edge corresponding to a leaf node in F is part of M∗. The function ψ is extended to an inner
node x of a flip tree with child nodes y and z by the recursion
ψ(x) := ψ(y) + ψ(z) + (1/α) ·min{ψ(y), ψ(z)} . (1)
For the ease of argumentation, we call the child with smaller (respectively, larger) value of ψ as
well as the link leading to its parent light (resp., heavy). We denote the light child of a node x as
xL and the heavy child as xH. Then we can rewrite the recursion from Eq. 1 as
ψ(x) := ψ(xH) + (1 + 1/α) · ψ(xL) .
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∼M∗
Figure 5: All leaves and isolated nodes of the flip forest F correspond to edges in the minimal-cost matching
M∗. Each inner node corresponds to the active edge that resulted from the respective flip. Note that the
edge that got flipped and is therefore irrevocably selected into MG has no corresponding node in F . For the
purpose of illustration, we can associate such an edge with the respective node as indicated by a line below
the respective inner node. These edges constitute the matching MG together with the edges corresponding
to isolated vertices and roots, indicated by a line above the node.
Lemma 4.6. Let x be a node in F and e an edge in G with x ∼ e. Then w(e) ≤ ψ(x).
Proof. We prove the statement by induction over the height of x in its flip tree. The assertion holds
for every leaf x ∼ e in the flip forest as ψ(x) = w(e) by definition. Assume that the statement
holds for the two children xL and xH of a node x that represents a flip of the edge (u, v). Then
x ∼ (M(u),M(v)) = e and we assume without loss of generality that xH ∼ (u,M(u)) = eu and
xL ∼ (v,M(v)) = ev. Thus, w(eu) ≤ ψ(xH) and w(ev) ≤ ψ(xL). This flip tree segment represents
the replacement of the edges eu and ev by e and (u, v), which happened because the edge (u, v)
was unstable with respect to M , that is, α · w(u, v) < min{w(ev), w(eu)}. Since G is metric, we
can bound w(e) as
w(e) ≤ w(eu) + w(ev) + w(u, v)
< w(eu) + (1 + 1/α) · w(ev)
≤ ψ(xH) + (1 + 1/α) · ψ(xL) (inductive hypothesis)
= ψ(x) .
Definition (Light Depth). The light depth λ(x) of a node x in a flip forest F is the number of
light links on the direct path from x to the root of the flip tree containing x.
Lemma 4.7. Every node x in a flip tree satisfies
ψ(x) =
∑
`∈L(x)
(1 + 1/α)λ(`)−λ(x) · ψ(`) .
Proof. We prove the statement by induction over the height of x in its flip tree. The statement
holds for a leaf node x since then we have L(x) = {x} and λ(x) − λ(x) = 0. Assume that the
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statement holds for both children xH and xL of a node x. By definition, we have
ψ(x) = ψ(xH) + (1 + 1/α) · ψ(xL)
=
∑
`∈L(x
H
)
(1 + 1/α)λ(`)−λ(xH) · ψ(`) + (1 + 1/α) ·
∑
`∈L(x
L
)
(1 + 1/α)λ(`)−λ(xL) · ψ(`)
=
∑
`∈L(x
H
)
(1 + 1/α)λ(`)−λ(x) · ψ(`) + (1 + 1/α) ·
∑
`∈L(x
L
)
(1 + 1/α)λ(`)−λ(x)−1 · ψ(`)
=
∑
`∈L(x
H
)
(1 + 1/α)λ(`)−λ(x) · ψ(`) +
∑
`∈L(x
L
)
(1 + 1/α)λ(`)−λ(x) · ψ(`)
=
∑
`∈L(x)
(1 + 1/α)λ(`)−λ(x) · ψ(`) ,
where we used λ(xL) = λ(x) + 1 and λ(xH) = λ(x).
Corollary 4.8 is immediate, since λ(rT ) = 0 for the root rT of a flip tree T .
Corollary 4.8. The root rT of a flip tree T satisfies
ψ(rT ) =
∑
`∈L(rT )
(1 + 1/α)λ(`) · ψ(`) .
The following observation stems from the fact that in each segment, the ψ-value of the parent
is at least (2 + 1/α) times that of the light child (equality holds when both children have the same
ψ-value).
Observation 4.9. For any flip tree T with root rT and any leaf ` of T , we have
ψ(rT ) ≥ (2 + 1/α)λ(`) · ψ(`) .
We now turn to bound ψ(rT ) for all trees T ∈ F with respect to the sum of the weights of the
edges that correspond to the leaves of T . Since all these edges are part of M∗ by construction of
F , this will allow us to bound the cost of MG with respect to M
∗.
Lemma 4.10. The virtual weights in a flip tree T satisfy
ψ(rT ) = O
(
(1 + 1/α)logn
∑
`∈L(rT )
ψ(`)
)
.
Proof. Corollary 4.8 implies that ψ(rT ) =
∑
`∈L(rT )(1 + 1/α)
λ(`) · ψ(`). We group the leaves
according to their light depth, where Lj denotes the set of leaves ` of T with λ(`) = j. The
equation for ψ(rT ) can now be rewritten as ψ(rT ) =
∑n
j=0
∑
`∈Lj (1 + 1/α)
j · ψ(`). Let Ψ> =
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∑n
j=j′
∑
`∈Lj (1 + 1/α)
j · ψ(`) for some j′ that will soon be determined. We apply Observation 4.9
and the fact that there are at most n leaves in T altogether to conclude
Ψ> =
n∑
j=j′
∑
`∈Lj
(1 + 1/α)j · ψ(`)
≤
n∑
j=j′
∑
`∈Lj
(
1 + 1/α
2 + 1/α
)j
· ψ(rT )
=
n∑
j=j′
|Lj |
(
1 + 1/α
2 + 1/α
)j
· ψ(rT )
≤ n ·
(
1 + 1/α
2 + 1/α
)j′
· ψ(rT ) .
Choosing j′ = log 2+1/α
1+1/α
(2n) = O(log n) yields Ψ> ≤ ψ(rT )/2. This means that the leaves with light
depth at most c log n for some constant c contribute at least half of ψ(rT ) and thus it suffices to
consider only those leaves in order to bound ψ(rT ):
ψ(rT ) ≤ 2 ·
c logn∑
j=0
∑
`∈Lj
(1 + 1/α)j · ψ(`) ≤ 2 · (1 + 1/α)c logn
∑
`∈L(rT )
ψ(`) .
At this stage, we would like to relate the virtual weight ψ(rT ) of the roots rT in F to the cost
of the stable matching MG returned by Greedy. To that end, we observe that MG consists of the
edges corresponding to the roots in F and to the edges that have been flipped along the course of
the execution; let D denote the set of the latter edges.
Consider the flip of edge (u, v), resulting in the insertion of edge (M(u),M(v)) ∼ x to M
and the removal of edges (u,M(u)) ∼ xL and (v,M(v)) ∼ xH from M . Since ψ(x) = ψ(xH) +
(1 + 1/α)ψ(xL), we have ψ(x) − (ψ(xL) + ψ(xH)) = ψ(xL)/α. Lemma 4.6 then implies that
ψ(x) − (ψ(xL) + ψ(xH)) ≥ w(u,M(u))/α, and since edge (u, v) was flipped, we have ψ(x) −
(ψ(xL) + ψ(xH)) ≥ w(u, v). Therefore,∑
e∈D
w(e) ≤
∑
internal x∈U
(ψ(x)− (ψ(xL) + ψ(xH))) =
∑
flip trees T
(
ψ(rT )−
∑
`∈L(T )
ψ(`)
)
,
where the second equation holds by a telescoping argument. Corollary 4.11 follows since c(M∗) =∑
`∈L(F ) ψ(`).
Corollary 4.11. The matching MG returned by Greedy satisfies c(MG) ≤ 2
∑
flip trees T ψ(rT )−
c(M∗).
We are now ready to establish the following lemma.
Lemma 4.12. The cost of the matching MG returned by Greedy for α = O(log n) is an O(1)
approximation of c(M∗).
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Proof. Employing Lemma 4.10 and setting α = O(log n), we get ψ(rT ) = O
(∑
`∈L(T ) ψ(`)
)
. Corol-
lary 4.11 and the fact that c(M∗) =
∑
`∈L(F ) ψ(`) then imply that c(MG) = O(c(M∗)) as de-
sired.
4.3 Tight Upper Bound
Our goal in this section is to show that when Greedy is invoked with parameter α for any α ≥ 1,
it returns an α-stable matching MG satisfying c(MG) = c(M
∗) ·O(nlog(1+1/(2α))). This is performed
by taking a deeper examination of the properties of our flip trees and their virtual weights. It will
be convenient to ignore the relation of the flip trees to the Greedy algorithm at this stage; in other
words, we consider an abstract full binary tree T with a function w : L(T ) → R≥0 that assigns
non-negative weights to the leaves of T , which then determines the virtual weight ψ(x) of each
node in T , following the recursion of Eq. (1). Note that we allow our tree T to have zero-weight
leaves now (this can only make our analysis more general).
Definition (Complete Binary Tree). A full binary tree T is called complete if all leaves are at
depth h(T ) or h(T )− 1. Given some positive integer n that will typically be the number of leaves
in some tree, let
h(n) = dlog ne and k(n) = 2h(n) − n .
Note that 0 ≤ k(n) < 2h(n)−1.
Definition (ψ-Balanced Flip Tree). A full binary tree T is called ψ-balanced if for any two sibling
nodes x, y in T , we have ψ(x) = ψ(y).
Consider some full binary tree T . Let Λ(T ) denote the sum of the virtual weights of T ’s leaves,
that is, Λ(T ) =
∑
`∈L(T ) ψ(`), and let Ψ(T ) = ψ(rT ) (recall that rT denotes the root of T ). The
following observation is established by induction on the depth of the nodes.
Observation 4.13. For any node v of a ψ-balanced full binary tree T , we have ψ(v) = (2 +
1/α)−d(v) ·Ψ(T ).
Definition (Effect of a Flip Tree). The effect η(T ) of a full binary tree T is defined to be
η(T ) =
Ψ(T )/Λ(T ) if Λ(T ) > 01 if Λ(T ) = 0 .
An n-leaf full binary tree T is said to be effective if it maximizes η(T ), namely, if there does not
exist any n-leaf full binary tree T ′ such that η(T ′) > η(T ).
Intuitively speaking, if we think of T as a flip tree, then its effect is a measure for the factor by
which the flips represented by T increase the cost of M∗ when applied to it. But, once again, we
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do not restrict our attention to flip trees at this stage. The effect of a full binary tree is essentially
determined by its topology and by the assignment of weights to its leaves. It is important to point
out that by Corollary 4.8, the effect of a full binary tree is not affected by scaling its leaf weights.
Our upper bound is established by showing that the effect of an effective n-leaf full binary tree
is O (nlog(1+1/(2α))). We begin by developing a better understanding of the topology of effective
ψ-balanced full binary trees.
Lemma 4.14. An effective n-leaf ψ-balanced full binary tree must be complete.
Proof. Aiming for a contradiction, suppose that T is not complete and scale the leaf weights in T so
that Ψ(T ) = 1. Because T is not complete, it must have leaves at depth d1 and at depth d2, where
d2 > d1 + 1. The assertion is established by showing that an n-leaf full binary tree with higher
effect can be obtained by a small modification to T ’s topology, in contradiction to the assumption
that T is effective.
Let y be a leaf at depth d1 and `1 and `2 be two leaves at depth d2 > d1 + 1 with parent
node z. Since T is ψ-balanced, we can employ Observation 4.13 to conclude that ψ(`1) = ψ(`2) =
(2 + 1/α)−d2 and ψ(y) = (2 + 1/α)−d1 .
Now, consider the ψ-balanced full binary tree T ′ obtained from T by removing `1 and `2 and
adding two new leaves `′1 and `′2 as children of y with virtual weight ψ(`′1) = ψ(`′2) = (2+1/α)−d1−1,
keeping the virtual weight of all other nodes unchanged. By doing so, we turn z — an internal
node in T — into a leaf (whose virtual weight remains ψ(z) = (2 + 1/α)−d2+1). On the other hand,
y which is a leaf in T , is an internal node in T ′. Therefore,
Λ(T ′) = Λ(T ) + ψ(`′1) + ψ(`
′
2) + ψ(z)− ψ(`1)− ψ(`2)− ψ(y)
= Λ(T ) + 2 · (2 + 1/α)−d1−1 + (2 + 1/α)−d2+1 − 2 · (2 + 1/α)−d2 − (2 + 1/α)−d1
= Λ(T ) + (2 + 1/α)−d1−1(2− (2 + 1/α)) + (2 + 1/α)−d2(2 + 1/α− 2)
= Λ(T ) + (1/α)((2 + 1/α)−d2 − (2 + 1/α)−d1−1)
< Λ(T ) .
As Ψ(T ′) = Ψ(T ) = 1, it follows that η(T ′) > η(T ), in contradiction to the effectiveness of T .
Next, we develop a closed-form expression for the effect of complete ψ-balanced full binary trees.
Lemma 4.15. The effect of an n-leaf complete ψ-balanced full binary tree T is
η(T ) =
(2 + 1/α)h
2h + k/α
,
where h = h(n) and k = k(n).
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Proof. Again we assume without loss of generality that the weights of the leaves are scaled so that
Ψ(T ) = 1. By definition, T has 2h − 2k leaves at depth h and k leaves at depth h− 1. Employing
Observation 4.13, we conclude
Λ(T ) = (2h − 2k) · (2 + 1/α)−h + k · (2 + 1/α)−(h−1)
= (2 + 1/α)−h · (2h − 2k + k · (2 + 1/α))
= (2 + 1/α)−h · (2h + k/α) .
Since Ψ(T ) = 1, we have η(T ) = 1/Λ(T ) which completes the proof.
Note that the expression for the effect of an n-leaf complete ψ-balanced full binary tree given
by Lemma 4.15 is monotonically increasing with h and monotonically decreasing with k. We are
now ready to show that it is essentially sufficient to consider complete ψ-balanced full binary trees.
Lemma 4.16. An effective n-leaf full binary tree must be ψ-balanced.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction on the number of leaves n. The base case of a tree
having a single leaf (which is also the root) holds vacuously; the base case of a tree having two
leaves is trivial. Assume that the assertion holds for trees with less than n leaves and let T
be an effective n-leaf full binary tree. Let TL and TH be the subtrees rooted at the light and
heavy, respectively, children of rT (break ties arbitrarily). Let nL and nH be the number of
leaves in TL and TH , respectively, where nL + nH = n and 0 < nL, nH < n. Observe that since
η(T ) = Ψ(TH)+(1+1/α)·Ψ(TL)Λ(TH)+Λ(TL) , both TL and TH have to be effective as otherwise, η(T ) could be
increased; more precisely, if Ti ∈ {TH , TL} is not effective, then one can increase Ψ(Ti) while
keeping Λ(Ti) unchanged, which results in an increased η(T ). Thus, by the inductive hypothesis,
we conclude that TL and TH must be ψ-balanced. Lemma 4.14 then guarantees that both TL and
TH are complete.
Aiming for a contradiction, suppose that T is not ψ-balanced, that is Ψ(TH) > Ψ(TL). Assume
without loss of generality that the leaf weights are scaled such that Λ(T ) = Λ(TH) + Λ(TL) = 1
and set Λ(TL) = x, Λ(TH) = 1− x, for some 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Let T be the tree minimizing x among all
trees satisfying the aforementioned assumptions.
We argue that x cannot be neither 0 nor 1. Indeed, if x = 1, then Ψ(TH) = 0, in contradiction
to the assumption that Ψ(TH) > Ψ(TL). On the other hand, if x = 0, then Ψ(T ) = Ψ(TH) and
Λ(T ) = Λ(TH), hence η(T ) = η(TH). But since TH has nH < n leaves, Lemma 4.15 guarantees that
its effect is smaller than that of an n-leaf complete ψ-balanced full binary tree, in contradiction to
the assumption that T is effective.
So, we may subsequently assume that 0 < x < 1. Employing Lemma 4.15, we can express Ψ(T )
as
Ψ(T ) = Ψ(TH) + (1 + 1/α) ·Ψ(TL) = (2 + 1/α)
hH
2hH + kH/α
· (1− x) + (1 + 1/α) · (2 + 1/α)
hL
2hL + kL/α
· x ,
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where hH = h(nH), kH = k(nH), hL = h(nL), and kL = k(nL). Using this expression, we can
formulate η(T ) as a function f = f(x), setting
f(x) =
(2 + 1/α)hH
2hH + kH/α
· (1− x) + (1 + 1/α) · (2 + 1/α)
hL
2hL + kL/α
· x . (2)
The crucial observation now is that f(x) is linear in x, thus dfdx (x) is independent of x. Moreover,
since T is not ψ-balanced, it follows that f is well defined — that is, Eq. (2) remains valid — in
a neighborhood of x = Λ(TL). Therefore, if,
df
dx (x) > 0, then f(x) = η(T ) can be increased by
increasing x (shifting weight from the leaves of TH to the leaves of TL), in contradiction to the
effectiveness of T . On the other hand, if dfdx (x) ≤ 0, then we can decrease x (shifting weight from
the leaves of TL to the leaves of TH) without decreasing f(x) = η(T ), contradicting the assumption
that x is minimum. The assertion follows.
Recalling that h = h(n) and k = k(n), we observe that
(2 + 1/α)h
2h + k/α
= Θ
(
(1 + 1/(2α))h
)
= Θ
(
nlog(1+1/(2α))
)
.
Combined with Lemmas 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 4.17. The effect of an n-leaf full binary tree is O(nlog(1+1/(2α))).
Now, let us return the focus to our flip forest. Recalling that
∑
flip trees T
∑
`∈L(T ) ψ(`) = c(M
∗),
and using Corollary 4.11, we conclude that
c(MG)
c(M∗)
= O
(∑
flip trees T Ψ(T )∑
flip trees T Λ(T )
)
= O
(
max
flip trees T
Ψ(T )
Λ(T )
)
= O
(
max
flip trees T
η(T )
)
.
The desired upper bound then follows from Corollary 4.17.
4.4 Lower Bound
Our goal in this section is to establish the lower bound of Theorem 4.1. The graph construction
that lies at the heart of this lower bound, denoted Hkα, is a direct generalization of the Reingold-
Tarjan graph Hk presented in Sect. 3 for arbitrary values of α. Specifically, the 2-vertex graph H1α
is identical to H1; and the 2k+1-vertex graph Hk+1α is constructed recursively by placing 2 disjoint
instances of Hkα, each of diameter D
k
α, on the real line, only that this time, the spacing between
them is set to Sk+1α = (1/α− ε)Dkα, for some sufficiently small ε > 0 that will be determined later
on. This implies that Dkα = (2 + 1/α− ε)k−1 and Sk+1α = (1/α− ε)(2 + 1/α− ε)k−1.
Now let M be an α-stable matching in Hkα. We argue that M has to contain each edge e =
(x, y) with w(e) = 1/α − ε. Indeed, if e /∈ M , then e is α-unstable with respect to M since
w(e) < α ·min{w(x, x′), w(y, y′)} for all other vertices x′, y′. Given that all vertices with distance
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1/α− ε are therefore already matched, we can apply the same argument for each edge connecting
two adjacent vertices with edge weight (1/α−ε)(2+1/α−ε) and thereby conclude that these edges
have to be in M as well. By repeating this argument, we end up with the unique α-stable matching
M that has to contain the edge (xk1, x
k
2k
) whose weight is Dkα and and all other edges whose weight
differs from 1. Thus, c(M) ≥ Dkα = (2 + 1/α− ε)k−1.
On the other hand, the cost of the minimum-cost matching M∗ is not larger than that of the
matching using all weight 1 edges, thus we can bound the cost of M∗ as c(M∗) ≤ 2k−1. Together,
we conclude that
PoSα(H
k
α) ≥
c(M)
c(M∗)
≥ (2 + 1/α− ε)
k−1
2k−1
= Ω
(
1 +
1
2α
)k−1
(3)
= Ω
(
nlog(1+
1
2α)
)
, (4)
where (3) holds by taking a sufficiently small ε and (4) follows by recalling that Hkα has 2n = 2
k
vertices.
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